Chris Olson
fefda7481f
Capability targeting (new feature): - loop --capability <SET|ALL> scopes which capability library the loop reasons against. data/capability_sets/<name>.json (same schema as capabilities.json) holds one-off targeted products; drop a file in and pass its name, no code changes. First set: agentminder (Broadcom AgentMinder, agentic-AI identity). - capabilities.set_active_set() swaps the active library; keyword pre-filter is bypassed for small targeted sets so every signal is evaluated. New 'capability-sets' command lists them; run banner shows the active set. LLM provider — the '429' was a disguised policy block: - Anthropic rejects Claude Code OAuth tokens on /v1/messages for non-Claude-Code traffic with a fake rate_limit_error (no anthropic-ratelimit-* headers). New 'claude-cli' provider runs inference through the sanctioned headless path (claude -p --append-system-prompt --model), now the default provider. - OAuth keychain token auto-refresh via headless claude when expired. Resilience: - STATE_DIR is overridable (macOS endpoint-security locked output/state via com.apple.macl); load_memory tolerates PermissionError; exa usage counter tolerates malformed files; run.py handles Ctrl-C cleanly (no traceback). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
51 lines
3.0 KiB
JSON
51 lines
3.0 KiB
JSON
{
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"version": "1.0",
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"lastUpdated": "2026-07-16",
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"_source": "https://www.broadcom.com/products/identity/agentminder",
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"_note": "One-off targeted capability set. Select at runtime: `loop --capability agentminder`. Add more sets as data/capability_sets/<name>.json with this same schema.",
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"capabilities": [
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{
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"id": "cap_iam_agentminder",
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"grouping": "Cybersecurity — Identity & Access Management",
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"category": "Agentic AI Security",
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"name": "AgentMinder — Secure Agentic AI (Identity & Governance for AI Agents)",
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"description": "Agentic security and governance platform that turns autonomous AI agents into production-grade 'digital employees': governs AI agents as first-class identities with least-privilege access, credential protection, centralized authentication/authorization, and lifecycle governance, on a cloud-native container-based architecture.",
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"businessProblems": [
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"AI agents/copilots being deployed with no identity, credential, or access governance",
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"Non-human identities (service accounts, bots, AI agents) proliferating outside IAM controls",
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"No least-privilege or audit trail for what autonomous agents can access and do",
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"Compliance/regulatory exposure from ungoverned agentic AI acting on production systems",
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"Security teams blocking AI initiatives because agent access cannot be controlled"
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],
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"buyingSignals": [
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"Announcements of agentic AI, AI agents, or copilot deployments in production",
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"AI transformation or GenAI initiatives touching core business systems",
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"Hiring for AI security, AI governance, ML platform, or non-human identity roles",
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"Executive posts about AI agents as 'digital workers' or 'digital employees'",
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"AI governance, responsible-AI, or AI-risk programs and committees being stood up",
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"Security incidents, breaches, or audit findings involving automation or bots",
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"Regulatory or compliance pressure on AI usage (finance, healthcare, government)",
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"Partnerships with AI platform vendors (OpenAI, Anthropic, Microsoft Copilot, agent frameworks)"
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],
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"antiSignals": [
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"Already owns AgentMinder per CRM",
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"Standardized on a competing agentic-AI security platform",
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"Explicit company policy prohibiting AI agent deployment"
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],
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"targetBuyer": {
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"titles": ["CISO", "Chief AI Officer", "VP Security", "Director IAM", "VP AI/ML Platform", "CTO"],
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"departments": ["Security", "IT", "AI/Data", "Risk & Compliance"]
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},
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"keywords": [
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"agentminder", "agentic ai", "ai agent", "ai agents", "autonomous agent",
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"digital employee", "digital worker", "copilot", "non-human identity", "nhi",
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"machine identity", "ai governance", "ai security", "least privilege",
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"agent identity", "genai", "generative ai", "ai risk", "responsible ai",
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"service account", "credential", "zero trust"
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]
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}
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],
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"bundleSignals": [],
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"globalAntiSignals": []
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}
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